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ABSTRACT
Recent studies show that using Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) affects party
preferences of voters, and hence leads to party switching. Party switching is a
necessary but insufficient condition for volatility (a net switch of voters to
other parties) and fragmentation (more parties gaining seats) at the aggregate
level of electoral constituencies. The research question addressed here is
whether the availability of VAAs in electoral constituencies weakens or
strengthens trends towards greater volatility and fragmentation as observed
in western democracies in the last decades. The data come from 380 Dutch
municipalities during the 2014 Dutch municipal council elections. In 133 of
them a VAA was available. Using a moderated mediation model that controls
for the municipal self-selection of a VAA, we find that a VAA by itself leads to
higher levels of volatility and fragmentation. However, VAA availability has a
dampening effect in municipal constituencies with characteristics (e.g.
population size, ethnic diversity, young average age) that would otherwise
make them more susceptible and prone to volatility and fragmentation.
Introduction
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are the most commonly used political web-
sites during election campaigns in many multiparty systems. They are popular
both among voters, but also valued by political parties. Most political parties
tend to support VAAs, especially if they fear that potential voters are not mobi-
lized by their own social networks, or will be mobilized towards other parties
by the mainstream media. For voters, VAAs are attractive for different reasons.
Especially in multiparty systems with numerous political alternatives on offer,
VAAs could diminish the information gap by helping voters to compare the
positions of many political parties with regard to issues that play a role in
the campaign, before making their final choice. Some voters use VAAs to
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check whether their preferred party indeed represents their issue positions,
others because they may be in doubt between parties, or just because they
search for the best party (van de Pol et al. 2014). VAAs could also be
labeled as Voter Engagement Applications because they offer the promise
to advance political knowledge, electoral literacy, voter engagement and
democratic participation (Lees-Marshment et al. 2015; Van der Linden and
Vowles 2016). Since in this paper we look at the implications of these appli-
cations on party switching, we stay with the more commonly used term VAA.
Starting from voters’ motivations to use a VAA, one would expect an effect
of obtaining VAA advice on party switching. With a few exceptions (Walgrave,
Van Aelst, and Nuytemans 2008; Enyedi 2015) most studies found such an
effect, regardless whether they were based on experiments, surveys among
VAA users, or representative panel surveys including both users and non-
users of VAAs (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007; Ladner, Fivaz, and Pianzola 2012;
Marschall and Schultze 2012; Pianzola et al. 2012; Vassil 2012; Alvarez et al.
2014; Pianzola 2014a, 2014b; Wall, Krouwel, and Vitiello 2014). Some studies
showed that VAA effects are partly but not fully endogenous. Prior party pre-
ference, for example, has not only a direct effect on the current vote, but
also an indirect effect through the VAA advice obtained, since prior party pre-
ference is embedded in exposure to self-selected media content and in issue
positions that in turn affect one’s agreement with VAA statements that
produce the obtained VAA advice (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007; Pianzola 2014a).
Effects on party switching occur especially if the advice obtained is not fully
endogenous but dissonant with prior political beliefs (Israel, Marschall, and
Schultze 2016) provided that convincing levels of overlap continue to exist
between these beliefs and the best ranked parties by a VAA (Alvarez et al.
2014). VAA effects on party switching most typically occur for younger voters
with sufficient knowledge to make sense of the advice obtained, especially
for those without strong predispositions to reject the advice given (Vassil 2012).
The current study takes party switching due to VAA use at the individual
level for granted. Instead, we examine the effects of the availability of a
VAA at the aggregate level in electoral constituencies on two output character-
istics in each constituency: on volatility – defined as a net shift of seats
to another party after elections (Pedersen 1979) – and fragmentation –
defined as the effective number of equally strong parties (Laakso and Taage-
pera 1979). Increased levels of volatility and fragmentation have been ident-
ified as two major characteristics of western democracies in recent decades
(WeBels et al. 2014). Several studies found electoral volatility (Chiaramonte
and Emanuele 2015) and party fragmentation (Anckar 2000; Gabriel, Hoff-
mann-Martinot, and Savitch 2000; Dahlberg 2007; Bischoff 2013) to be associ-
ated with demographic and socio-economic variables.
Individual party switching is a necessary, yet insufficient condition for
aggregate electoral volatility and party system fragmentation. Both
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presuppose switching voters. As said, party switching is not a sufficient con-
dition. If, for instance, all voters in a two-party system with two equally
strong parties switch to the other party, then net volatility turns out to be
zero. Party switching could result in fragmentation, but also in one dominant
party. We do not know under which conditions VAA effects on party switching
translate either into increased or into decreased volatility and fragmentation.
The research question addressed here is whether VAAs contribute to volatility
and fragmentation, or whether VAAs counteract developments and con-
ditions that otherwise would have increased volatility and fragmentation.
We will develop a research model that allows for the possibility that VAA
availability and usage increases volatility and fragmentation in electoral con-
stituencies with specific demographic and socio-economic background
characteristics, while they decrease volatility and fragmentation in electoral
constituencies with opposite characteristics. The research model will have
to take into account the endogeneity of VAA availability in an electoral con-
stituency (see also Kreuzer 2016) since VAA availability may itself depend
on the same demographic and socio-economic variables that favor or
hamper volatility and fragmentation. Taking into account the endogeneity
of VAA availability enables us to isolate VAA effects on volatility and fragmen-
tation in spite of the spurious correlation due to common demographic and
socio-economic origins of VAA availability on the one hand and volatility
and fragmentation on the other.
Themodel will be applied in the context of the 2014 elections for 380 Dutch
municipal councils. The Netherlands provides an excellent case to put the
research model to the test. VAAs in the Netherlands were made available
from the nineties onwards and from a comparative perspective, VAA use is
high (Krouwel, Vitiello, and Wall 2014; Garzia and Marschall 2014). In national
election campaigns almost half of the population uses a VAA. National elections
from the 90s also showed higher levels of electoral volatility and an increasing
number of parties in Parliament (Mair 2008; van derMeer et al. 2012; Dassonne-
ville 2013), suggesting there might be a relation between VAA availability and
increased volatility and fragmentation. The research question, however,
requires a quasi-experimental research design with sufficient cases with and
without the availability of a VAA, so as to isolate the genuine effect of endogen-
ous VAA availability on volatility and fragmentation in spite of possible spurious
correlations. Therefore, we turn to the 2014 elections for municipal councils.
Municipality-tailored VAAsweremade available during the 2014Dutchmunici-
pal elections in 133 out of the 380 municipalities in which elections were held.
Why VAA advice may increase volatility and fragmentation
VAAs carry the potential to close the information gap that is felt by many
voters (Kamoen et al. 2015). They aim at voter engagement in spite of a
JOURNAL OF ELECTIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTIES 77
complex political environment (Van der Linden and Vowles 2016). Especially
in multiparty systems with numerous political alternatives on offer, they
may help voters to comprehend whether issue positions of parties match
their own preferences (Krouwel, Vitiello, and Wall 2014). This is even more rel-
evant for choosing between parties that have relatively similar positions in the
political landscape (Dassonneville and Dejaeghere 2014; van der Meer et al.
2015). VAA advice affects especially politically less-informed users with a
lower level of education and knowledge (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007).
At the municipal level, voters may experience an even larger information
gap. In second-order elections like the municipality elections there is less
media attention than for national elections (De Vreese, Lauf, and Peter
2006) and the party system may differ from the national landscape. Addition-
ally, interest of voters and electoral turnout are also lower (Hobolt & Wittrock
2011), so it is likely that at the municipal level, voters have less fixed party pre-
ferences and are generally less aware of the issues and the positions of the
political parties. While major politically contentious national issues are exten-
sively discussed in the media, at the local level the media landscape is often
much weaker or even absent (Nielsen 2015). This means that politically rel-
evant information included in the VAA about the parties competing for
seats in the municipal council and their positions on specific issues, will be
one of the few and scarce sources upon which voters can base their vote
decision. The effect of VAAs on vote for the municipal council may, therefore,
even be stronger than for the vote for the national parliament. We argue that
VAA availability and usage as a consequence also may impact on volatility and
fragmentation.
A first reason why VAA effects on party choice may accrue to volatility at the
aggregate level is that VAAs neglect important voter considerations such as
prior party choice, party identification, leadership evaluations, incumbency
and assessments of political competence. VAAs, therefore, systematically
put parties that strongly rely on those considerations at a disadvantage.
VAAs also neglect party size, thus fail to cue strategic voting for major
parties, which implies that VAA effects on party switching will also accrue
to fragmentation at the level of electoral constituencies. Municipal VAAs typi-
cally include the issue positions of all parties that compete for seats in the
municipal council; even those running for the first time and that do not
have any seats. In fact, as VAAs at the municipal level are often developed
in conjunction with all political parties running in the election, both large
and small parties have equal agenda-setting opportunities. This equal
playing field – where the smaller parties are treated equally to the larger
parties – could also cause voters to switch allegiance or end up with a
smaller or new party as the most proximate to their preferences. Empirical evi-
dence shows that VAA use widens the choice set of VAA users and, as Kamoen
et al. (2015) showed, voters who reported increased political knowledge
78 J. KLEINNIJENHUIS ET AL.
after having used a VAA were more likely to take the vote advice into
consideration.
The second reason why party switching due to VAAs gives rise to volatility
and fragmentation at the aggregate level is that each VAA design puts specific
parties at an advantage to the detriment of others. Three aspects of VAA
design matter most: issue selection, question wording and the decision
rule. With regard to issue selection, Lefevere and Walgrave (2014) show
with an experiment that parties benefit from a VAA that includes issues
owned by them. Next, question wording and framing puts specific parties
at an advantage. For example, parties that oppose free childcare (as this
has regressive income effects) benefit from this question being framed as
“households with dual incomes should pay for child care”, rather than
as “childcare should be freely available to everyone regardless of income”
(Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007). Thirdly, specific decision rules – alternatively
labeled as decisional logics (Mendez 2016), or simply as algorithms (van der
Linden and Dufresne 2016) – direct voters to specific parties (Kleinnijenhuis
and Krouwel 2008; Louwerse and Rosema 2014; Mendez 2016), for example
a low dimensional Euclidean decision rule as compared to a high-dimensional
Manhattan city-block decision rule (van der Linden and Dufresne 2016). The
consequence of these three aspects of VAA designs in short, is a certain
level of arbitrariness in the advices VAAs provide to voters, which also may
lead to fragmentation and volatility.
Both arguments lead to the conclusion that we do not expect simply
random effects of VAAs on party choice, but systematic effects. This gives
rise to hypothesis (H1) that the availability of a VAA increases electoral volatility
and fragmentation at the aggregate level of the constituency.
Effects of municipal conditions on volatility and fragmentation
Obviously, VAAs are not the only source of volatility and fragmentation. Longi-
tudinal comparative research at the national level in 18 countries shows an
overall tendency towards increased volatility and fragmentation (WeBels
et al. 2014, 5–8, 1846), also in party systems without a strong presence and
usage of VAAs.
Both demographic and socio-economic variables are at the heart of vola-
tility (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015) and party fragmentation (Anckar
2000; Gabriel, Hoffmann-Martinot, and Savitch 2000; Dahlberg 2007; Bischoff
2013) at the municipal level. In municipal elections, population size is a key
determinant of the political trust of residents (Denters 2002, 1843) and on
voter turnout. Larger municipalities show lower trust levels in political insti-
tutions and elites and lower political participation. Population size and urban-
ization are correlated with religious and ethnic diversity, but also with crime
levels. Research in the United States (Putnam (2007, 1867) finds that ethnic
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diversity undermines social and political trust. In Europe, lower levels of social
and political trust are not caused by ethnic diversity itself, but by related vari-
ables like lower levels of trust in some minority groups, higher crime levels
and economic deprivation (Tolsma, van der Meer, and Gesthuizen 2009; van
der Meer and Tolsma 2014). Municipalities with larger ethnic diversity and
minority groups, as well as weaker economic structures (more citizens with
lower income, lower educational attainment and higher unemployment
levels) also have lower electoral participation.
This leads to the hypothesis (H2) that the more urban and multicultural a
municipality is, and the more deprived in socio-economic structures, the
higher volatility and fragmentation will be.
Self-selection of VAAs by municipalities and VAA effects
In the 2014 Dutch municipal elections, city councils themselves, thus ulti-
mately the incumbent political parties, decide to develop a municipality-
tailored VAA. In Dutch local elections national political preferences dominate
and media outlets primarily pay attention to national issues and parties’ pos-
itions on these national issues (e.g. employment, immigration), rather than
local issues and party stances. Nevertheless, Dutch municipal councils do
decide on important issues with regard to health care, infrastructure,
parking facilities, cultural institutions and local the economy. As many local
parties compete in Dutch municipal elections alongside local branches of
national political parties, voters need specific information on issues stances
of these local parties. Almost one in three voters support a local party in
municipal elections. In addition, not all parties represented in national parlia-
ment participate in each municipality. The anti-immigrant Party for Freedom
(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), for example, only fields candidates in two muni-
cipalities. This results in substantial differences of party systems at the local
compared to the national level. This is one of the main reasons political
parties at the local level believe that many voters may need a municipality-tai-
lored VAA to make an informed vote decision.
As in previous election, VAA developers approached all city councils in
2014 offering to develop such a platform, which involves several meetings
with all political parties in the municipality to determine the salient issues
and the positions of the parties on these issues. This active co-production
requires an explicit consent of all the parties participating in the municipal
elections, which is often only taken after extensive inter-party discussions
and presentations by multiple VAA developers. In these meetings, the
results from studies about the effects of VAAs are extensively discussed,
especially effects on knowledge and turnout of voters who would otherwise
receive insufficient information on the issue positions of parties.
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Local authorities and local media care about democratic legitimacy,
informed citizenship and turnout at municipal elections. We expect that
especially municipalities who have reason to fear that their inhabitants are
insufficiently informed about local politics will choose to pay for a municipal-
ity-tailored VAA. Urban, multicultural municipalities and those with poorer
and younger populations (e.g. students) may hope that making a municipal-
ity-tailored VAA available increases informed citizenship and ultimately par-
ticipation. An additional reason why especially multicultural municipalities
will employ a VAA is that especially urban municipalities with a large popu-
lation size, and a corresponding large municipal budget, tend to be multicul-
tural. A large municipal budget makes it easy to pay for a municipality-tailored
VAA as costs are relatively low (approximately 10,000 euro) and regional
media concern Wegener and Stemvan, a new VAA supplier, actually offered
VAAs for free to many municipalities.
The third hypothesis (H3) is therefore that the same factors that cause vola-
tility and fragmentation also make it more likely that a VAA will be made avail-
able. Especially relatively urban and multicultural municipalities and
municipalities with a relatively poor and young population are expected to
offer a tailor made municipal VAA.
VAA availability is a discrete novelty, although H3 predicts that VAA avail-
ability is in part endogenous because their availability is fostered by factors
that also determine volatility and fragmentation directly. The next question is
whether VAA availability may in turn diminish the latter effects of these factors.
The moderating effect of VAAs on factors that increase volatility and
fragmentation
The hope of political parties competing for seats in the municipal councils that
choose to employ a municipality-tailored VAA is that –most of all – voters will
make a better-informed decision in casting their vote. Particularly municipali-
ties with proportionally larger segments of young (i.e. students) and multicul-
tural citizens will be inclined to employ a VAA because these inhabitants are
expected to gain most in political knowledge as a result of their use of the VAA
and subsequently turnout in the election. In such potentially highly fragmen-
ted constituencies, the availability of a VAA may actually diminish, dampen or
moderate the effects of the social structures that would otherwise have
increased volatility and fragmentation.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) is that VAA availability diminishes/moderates the
impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on volatility and
fragmentation.
Figure 1 visualizes these four hypotheses in a causal diagram.
From a methodological point of view, Figure 1 can be understood as a
cybernetic policy model, which can be represented as a regression model
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with interaction effects (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003), or more precisely as a
mediated moderator model (Hayes 2013). VAA availability is represented in
this cybernetic model as a mediator of the relationship between demographic
and socio-economic conditions on the one hand and volatility and fragmen-
tation on the other, but also as a moderator of this relationship. This model
accounts for the endogeneity of VAA availability. Note that the endogeneity
of political institutions – such as proportional representation – is usually
modeled by considering such institutions merely as a mediator, rather than
as both a mediator and a moderator (Kreuzer 2016). A cybernetic policy
model predicts, for example, the break-even point between water damage
and fire damage after sending the fire brigade to a more or less serious fire.
The question in this article is whether employing a VAA by a local council suf-
ficiently diminishes the effects of a less-informed, poor, young and multicul-
tural citizenry on volatility and fragmentation, given the autonomous
effects of a VAA on volatility and fragmentation. The model from Figure 1
can be used to predict the break-even point between volatility and fragmen-
tation due to a VAA, and volatility and fragmentation to characteristics of a




Data on the use of VAAs in Dutch municipalities were obtained from the
developers of Stemwijzer, Kieskompas, DeStemvan and from some spokesper-
sons of newspaper publisher Wegener. It is possible that a very small number
of municipal VAAs have been overlooked in this study. In one case, a
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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municipal VAA was not included because it appeared to be a subordinate part
of a municipal website with lots of other activities. Data about structural
characteristics of municipalities were obtained from the statline.cbs.nl
website of Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), the Dutch Office for Statistics.
To assess how many parties entered the local council, data on municipal
election results for each of the 931 nominal different parties that gained
at least one seat in one municipality were obtained from the www.
verkiezingsuitslagen.nl website of the Electoral Commission. The data set
underlying this article is available from Data Archiving and Networked Ser-
vices (DANS) (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2016).
Measures
VAA availability. Data on VAA employment in municipalities were obtained
from the two major national VAAs who delivered municipal VAAs on
request of the local councils, Stemwijzer and Kieskompas, from a new devel-
oper StemVan/Nu.nl and fromWegener newspapers, who developed VAAs for
many municipalities in regions where they publish regional newspapers. The
percentage of VAA users per municipality could not be included since this
number was not available for all VAAs. The number of available VAAs per
municipality, of which the mean will be reported in Table 1, is a skew distrib-
uted variable. Instead of this skew variable, a dichotomous variable that rep-
resents whether in a given municipality one or more of the VAAs were
available or not is assumed in the theory section, and used in Figures and
model tests.
Turnout. Turnout per municipality was retrieved from statline.cbs.nl.
Volatility. Pedersen’s volatility index (Pedersen 1979) was applied at the
municipal level by computing, for parties that gained seats in the municipal
election in 2014, the difference between their percentage of seats in 2014
and their percentage of seats after the previous municipal elections in
2010.








M SD M SD M SD F(376,3)
Turnout (%) 58.3 6.6 56.5 6.6 51.8 5.4 16.5 ***
Volatility (%) 17.0 0.1 17.9 0.1 18.7 0.1 0.9 ns
Fragmentation (effective # parties) 5.6 1.3 6.8 1.7 8.1 1.3 61.5 ***
N municipalities 247 97 36 380
Note: ns no significant differences between three categories of municipalities.
***p < .001.
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Fragmentation, was measured as the “effective number” of parties (in the
same vein as (Laakso 1977), but based on the perplexity measure P, which
is a transformation of the entropy measure H into entropy expressed in





in which mi is the proportion of
the number of seats in the municipal council occupied by party i. In a munici-
pality with two parties with an equal number of seats perplexity amounts to 2,
but in a municipality with one big party and a very small party with one seat
only, the perplexity would only amount to a number slightly greater than
1. The entropy-based measure is used here because it is relatively sensitive
for the number, and the relative size, of relatively small parties that are routi-
nely collapsed into “other parties” in brief accounts of party size (Laakso 1977).
Population Size. Population size in 2012 is available directly from
statline.cbs.nl.
Ethnic diversity could be measured based on CBS data per municipality split
up by country of origin, from which the size of the native Dutch population is
easily calculated. Analogous to the calculation of party fragmentation, ethnic
fragmentation is defined as the perplexity of different nationalities.
Crime. Crime registration in the Netherlands is messy and incomplete due
to new registration systems at the level of police districts, in which data for
several municipalities are combined. As a measure of municipal crime the
number of deaths due to external death causes in 2005 and 2006
(statline.cbs.nl).
Average income. Average income was available for 2011 (statline.cbs.nl).
Age. To measure whether older or younger generations constitute the
majority population in a municipality, those under the age of 20 are sub-
tracted from the population of age younger than 65, and divided by total
population size could still be used (statline.cbs.nl).
Dimensionality of municipal citizenries. A principal component analysis of
structural municipal characteristics with varimax rotation shows two dimen-
sions with an eigenvalue greater than 1 which together explain 74% of the
variance in municipal characteristics: a cultural dimension focusing on popu-
lation size, ethnic diversity and crime levels (factor loadings, respectively, 0.93,
0.82 and 0.93), and a socio-economic dimension focusing on average income
levels and a youthful population (factor loadings 0.83 and 0.77). The poles of
the cultural dimension are labeled as monocultural/rural and multicultural/
urban, and the poles of the socio-economic dimension as poor/young and
rich/old.
Data analysis
The conceptual model in Figure 1 with the “availability of a municipal VAA”
as a mediated moderator does not give rise to a multi-normal distribution.
The dichotomous nature of the mediated moderator, however, precludes
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the use of improved estimation techniques offered by Hayes (2013, model
74). Instead we apply logistic regression analysis to test how municipal
characteristics affect VAA availability (hypothesis H3) in combination with
ordinary least squares regression analysis to estimate the main effects
(H1 and H2) and their interaction effect (H4) on volatility and fragmentation.
The supplementary materials provide an elaborated example of this
mediated moderator model.
Results
In presenting our results we first provide descriptive evidence on the endo-
geneity of the availability of a VAA in a municipality. This shows to what
extent municipalities that offered a VAA to their citizens during the campaign
differ in terms of electoral volatility and fragmentation from those that did not
offer a VAA. Next we turn to the location of municipalities on the cultural
dimension and the socio-economic dimension. Thereafter, the two are com-
bined by estimating the parameters of the research model (Figure 1) in
order to ascertain the size of the moderating effect of a VAA on the effect
of cultural and socio-economic municipal conditions on volatility and frag-
mentation as compared to the size of the direct effect of the employment
of a VAA on volatility and fragmentation.
Turnout, volatility and fragmentation split up by VAA availability
Table 1 shows how average turnout, volatility and fragmentation differ
between municipalities without voting assistance with one VAA and multiple
VAAs. The F-ratio’s based on a univariate Analysis of Variance signal whether
the observed differences are statistically significant.
Clearly municipalities with a VAA, especially municipalities with more than
one VAA, show a significantly lower turnout, and a significantly higher frag-
mentation. They appear to show also a higher volatility, but this difference
is statistically insignificant. Our argument is that these differences do not
exclude the possibility that VAAs may dampen the effects of socio-economic
and demographic factors that otherwise would have resulted in even higher
levels of volatility and fragmentation.
Endogeneity of VAA availability
The relationship between municipal VAA availability, turnout, volatility and
fragmentation on the one hand and demographic and socio-economic
municipal characteristics on the other, can be displayed in a co-ordinate
system defined by a horizontal socio-economic poor–rich axis and a vertical
cultural multicultural–monocultural axis (cf. Method section). Two diagonal
axes are added: the poor and multicultural versus rich and monocultural
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axis, and the rich and multicultural versus poor and monocultural axis. Muni-
cipalities are either located in one of the eight octants defined by the four
axes, or in the centrist category – which was defined by a score of less than
0.5 standard deviation on each of the dimensions that define the eight
octants. Only the most prototypical municipalities – those with the highest
scores on one of the eight poles, and those with the lowest scores for the cen-
trist category – are shown in Figure 2. Appendix (see supplementary materials)
provides a full categorization of all municipalities. Figure 2 shows for example
that the three largest cities of the Netherlands, The Hague, Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, are the most prototypical examples of multicultural municipalities
with average values on the socio-economic dimension. For each of the nine
categories of municipalities, average VAA deployment, average volatility,
average fragmentation and average turnout is displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Average VAA employment, volatility, fragmentation and turnout as a function
of a municipality’s location on the cultural dimension and the socio-economic dimension.
Notes: vaa: percent municipalities who employed a VAA; turn: turnout percent at municipal elections;
volat: volatility, percent of seats for different party compared to previous municipal elections; frag: frag-
mentation as measured by perplexity, which is the number of equally strong parties.
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Figure 2 shows a clockwise pattern with regard to the deployment of VAAs,
turnout, volatility and fragmentation. Clearly, the more multicultural the con-
stituency, the more frequent a VAA is co-developed: in 95% of the multicul-
tural municipalities a VAA was made available. This percentage is 68% in
poor multicultural municipalities and still high for rich multicultural municipa-
lities (58%). It is much lower for rich municipalities (20%) and lowest for mono-
cultural municipalities (13%) as the hand of the VAA clock moves downward.
This clockwise relationship shows the endogeneity of VAA availability. It offers
a first indication of the plausibility of VAA self-selection (H3) and of the origin
of volatility and fragmentation not only in VAA deployment (H1), but also in
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of municipalities (H2).
Socio-economic and cultural factors as origins of volatility and
fragmentation
The next question is whether Figure 2 also shows that the cultural dimension
and the socio-economic dimension can be held accountable for fragmenta-
tion and volatility in line with hypothesis H2. If we look in the octants of
Figure 2 at the numbers for volatility and next at those for fragmentation
with these questions in mind, we see that – with regard to volatility – this
is on average higher in multicultural municipalities (21%) than in monocul-
tural municipalities (14%). Yet volatility is higher on average in the richer
municipalities (20%) than in poor municipalities (14%). For volatility, the cul-
tural dimension matters in the expected direction, but on the socio-economic
dimension the relation seems to be in the opposite direction of what was
expected.
For fragmentation both dimensions matter in the expected direction. On
the average fragmentation is twice as high in multicultural municipalities
(8.3 effective parties) than in monocultural municipalities (4.9 effective
parties), and slightly higher in poor municipalities (6.1 effective parties) than
in rich municipalities (5.9 effective parties). Also, in poor monocultural muni-
cipalities the effective number of parties is higher (5.4) than in rich monocul-
tural municipalities (4.9 effective parties), while poor multicultural
municipalities have more effective parties (7.7) than rich multicultural munici-
palities (7.2 effective parties). In short, Figure 2 shows a similar clockwise
pattern in fragmentation as in VAA availability. All in all, our preliminary con-
clusion with regard to hypothesis H2 appears to be that especially the cultural
dimension explains municipal variations in volatility and fragmentation.
Model tests
To unravel whether online VAAs have an additional effect on top of the cul-
tural and the socio-economic dimension on the rise of volatility and
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fragmentation, the research model in Figure 1 should be assessed at the level
of municipalities (n = 380).
As could be expected already on the basis of our findings above, the socio-
economic dimension has very little explanatory value for the rise or decline in
volatility after VAA deployment by a local council, while the location of the
municipality on the cultural dimension seems to have a higher impact. For
volatility, we thus focus on the cultural dimension (Figure 3).
Within the cultural dimension, ethnic diversity is the most important pre-
dictor. With ethnic diversity as one independent variable, the structure of
Figure 3 becomes identical to the conceptual model of Figure 1. It should
be noted that it may not be ethnic diversity by itself that matters, as was
suggested by Putnam (2007), but the lower levels of social and political
trust within important minority groups (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).
The mediated moderator model shows that the availability of a VAA in a
municipality on average contributes b = 0.13, or 13% to the volatility level
(on the 0–1 scale of volatility), which is in line with hypothesis H1. This
means that in a municipality council of seven or eight seats, one seat will
be allotted to another party after the election, simply due to the availability
of a VAA for voters in that municipality. If the number of equally numerous
settled ethnic groups in a municipality increases by one, volatility increases
in line with hypothesis H2 on average by 11% (a = 0.11), but this effect is
diminished if the municipality’s voters are provided with a VAA (c =−0.09)
in line with the moderation hypothesis H4. If a VAA is available (something
that the coefficient d (=0.41) suggests is not unlikely in such circumstances),
volatility increases on the average not by 11% but by 11–9 = 2%. In such a cir-
cumstance, the effects of ethnic fragmentation and VAA deployment seem to
virtually balance each other out.
Figure 3. Estimates of autonomous and moderating effects of VAA advice on volatility.
Notes: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10, ns not significant (two sided). Numbers are unstandar-
dized regression coefficients.
88 J. KLEINNIJENHUIS ET AL.
The mediated moderator model allows us to calculate a break-even point
in ethnic diversity. The break-even point is located at the degree of ethnic
diversity in which a municipality with a VAA becomes less volatile than a
municipality without a VAA. The degree of ethnic diversity at the break-
even point can be calculated as – (b/c) = 1.51. In 181 out of the 380 municipa-
lities ethnic diversity exceeds 1.51 ethnic groups. If diminishing volatility
would have been the only rationale to make a VAA available, then 181 muni-
cipalities should have made a VAA available. In 51% of these 181 municipali-
ties a VAA was indeed made available. Only 20% of the municipalities below
the break-even point of ethnic diversity used a VAA in the campaign. To put it
differently, if volatility would have been the only decision criterion, then out of
the category of municipalities with an ethnic diversity higher than 1.51, 51%
of the municipalities who employed a VAA made a rational decision, as well as
the 80% of the municipalities with a low volatility in which no VAA was made
available. The supplementary materials provide further elaboration.
Figure 4 shows the estimates for a mediated moderator model to compare
the direct effect and moderated effects of the deployment of a VAA on party
fragmentation, with as antecedent variables both the cultural dimension as
the socio-economic dimension.
The regression analysis shows that the availability of a VAA increases the
number of equally strong parties in the city council on the average by b =
0.43 additional party. Would a typical municipality (score 0 on the cultural
Figure 4. Estimates of autonomous and moderating effects of VAA advice on fragmenta-
tion.
Notes: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10, ns not significant (two sided). The numbers represent
unstandardized regression coefficients.
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dimension) change into a somewhat poor, somewhat multicultural municipal-
ity (with scores of +1 standard deviation on both dimensions), then the
number of equally strong parties would increase on average by a1 +a2 =
1.14+0.19 = 1.33 additional parties. In case a modal municipality (with a
score of 0 on the multicultural dimension) would join the extreme category
of the 2.5% most multicultural municipalities, then on average a number of
2.66 additional parties would be expected to enter the municipal council.
By deploying a VAA, the number of parties in a municipality in which 1.33
additional party was to be expected because of multiculturalism, the effect
is moderated and the council will most likely only accrue 1.33 – c1–c2 = 0.86
additional party.
Because two antecedent dimensions play their role, the computation of
a break-even line instead of a break-even point is appropriate. Along the cul-
tural dimension the formula of this break-even line is (−b −c2 Socioecnomic)/
c1. With, for example, a neutral score of 0 on the socio-economic dimension
this formula reduces to a break-even point of −b c1 = 1.47
/
, or roughly 1.5
standard deviation to the multicultural side. Thirty-one municipalities are
more multicultural than this break-even point. Once more, the conclusion is
that the mediated moderator model estimates show that deployment of a
VAA in a local election enhances fragmentation, but diminishes the fragmen-
tation that otherwise would have resulted from real-world conditions in poor
and multicultural municipalities. In both cases the overall result of deploying a
VAA is to impact positively the dependent variable, creating higher levels of
volatility and fragmentation than would have been seen had no VAA been
deployed. However, for highly multicultural municipalities these direct
effects are largely offset by the VAAs’ moderating effects on the effects that
multiculturalism would otherwise have shown. In the case of fragmentation
the same applies to municipalities that are relatively poor.
The current study focused on electoral volatility and fragmentation of
municipal councils in a multiparty democracy. Other studies showed
already the beneficial effects of VAAs for voter knowledge (Schultze 2014;
Kamoen et al. 2015) and a higher turnout (Fivaz and Nadig 2010; Ladner
and Pianzola 2010; Ladner, Fivaz, and Pianzola 2012; Marschall and Schultze
2012). When the mediated moderator model of this study is applied to
turnout in Dutch municipalities, results show that VAA effects on turnout
are also contingent on socio-economic and demographic factors. In municipa-
lities in which the score of the citizenry on the multicultural dimension is one
standard deviation above average, turnout will be lower on average by 4.5%,
except when a VAA is employed, in which case turnout will be lower on
average by 3.0% only. These additional results for turnout suggests that
VAA deployment is helpful to enhance democratic citizenship and engage-
ment, but usually cannot totally balance out the effects of increased volatility
and party fragmentation due to demographic and socio-economic conditions.
90 J. KLEINNIJENHUIS ET AL.
Yet, in highly fragmented and poorer constituencies, VAA deployment does
have a substantial dampening effect (see supplementary materials).
Discussion
The main question addressed here is whether the availability of a VAA,
increases volatility and fragmentation, or whether VAA availability also
diminishes volatility and fragmentation that otherwise would have resulted
from demographic and socio-economic conditions. This question can be
answered if we can compare a sufficiently large number of electoral constitu-
encies that vary in terms of cultural and socio-economic conditions and in the
deployment of a VAA. The Dutch municipal elections of March 2014 offered an
ideal opportunity for such an investigation as 133 out of the 380 municipali-
ties in which elections were held made a VAA available to voters. Demo-
graphic and socio-economic conditions in Dutch municipalities can be
largely summarized in a cultural dimension consisting of population size
(urban versus rural), ethnic diversity (multicultural versus monocultural) and
crime levels, and in a socio-economic dimension consisting of wealth (poor
versus rich inhabitants) and age (young versus old inhabitants). The citizenries
of these 380 municipalities vary along both the cultural dimension and the
socio-economic dimension.
Estimates of mediated moderator models (Hayes 2013) indicated indeed
that VAAs do autonomously enhance volatility and fragmentation. At the
same time they also counteract the effects on volatility and fragmentation
caused by demographic and socio-economic conditions. To our knowledge
this is the first study on VAA effects that shows that VAAs not simply
enhance party switching and volatility, but that VAA deployments (Van der
Linden and Vowles 2016) also have a dampening effect on volatility and frag-
mentation. If it can be assumed that municipalities want to prevent high levels
of volatility and fragmentation, then break-even calculations indicates that in
an overwhelming majority of the observed municipalities the decision that
was made whether or not to make a VAA available turns out to have been
rational. VAA deployments are overwhelmingly focused on municipalities
where their presence does the most good in these terms.
One important limitation of the current study is that the actual use by
voters of the various VAAs at the municipal level could not be taken into
account due to a lack of data for some VAAs. Obviously VAA effects on elec-
toral volatility and fragmentation will be smaller when fewer voters use such
applications.1 However, VAA use is widespread during Dutch elections.
Generalizations of our findings are not straightforward. VAA effects could
be less important in municipal electoral systems with an elected mayor, as
incumbency, competence and personality become relevant considerations
for voters. VAA effects on fragmentation at the national level may actually
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be smaller due to stronger voter attachments to parties and higher knowl-
edge levels. The fragmentation effect of municipal VAAs result – at least
partly – from the requirement of local councils that VAA developers include
each and every political party entering the race on equal footing. At the
national level, VAA developers usually exclude many small parties that are
either not represented or will not gain seats according to opinion polls – or
they leave the inclusion of minor parties to the VAA user. It is likely that
in the Dutch multiparty systems with a very low electoral threshold of
one seat, VAA effects on parliamentary fragmentation are larger than in multi-
party systems with a higher electoral threshold or in majoritarian two-party
systems.
An important finding is that, on average, VAAs cannot completely compen-
sate for the cultural and socio-economic conditions that increased electoral
volatility and fragmentation in western democracies in recent decades
(WeBels et al. 2014), thereby affecting the legitimacy and stability of demo-
cratic government. Of course, we do not argue that all change and electoral
turnover is bad or that new parties entering parliaments or councils cannot
be a sign of a healthy and vibrant democracy. Indeed, one of the main func-
tions of elections is “voting the rascals out”. However, if VAAs by themselves
contribute to electoral volatility and fragmentation, VAA developers need to
be careful that the “direction” voters are sent by their advice do not put
specific parties at an advantage to the detriment of others. Only then they
can be truly Voter Engagement applications.
VAA designers can presumably do more to abandon or complement
(elements of) decision rules in their VAAs that tend to increase volatility and
fragmentation by highlighting and favoring small parties without a policy
record to the detriment of party loyalty to more moderate established
parties. In addition, more can be done to abandon unimportant and ambigu-
ous issues that increase noise in VAA advice. Our results also show that VAAs
do counterbalance volatility and fragmentation that result from structural
demographic factors. This dampening effect is probably larger at the national
level due to the exclusion (or less prominent positioning) of smaller parties in
VAAs.
Next to this likely dampening effect, we should also weigh the positive
effects on turnout, voter engagement and a better-informed citizenry as an
effect of VAA use in our overall assessment of their utility. While the selection
and framing of issues might be highly problematic, VAAs do force parties to
take clearer stances on more issues and allow voters to easily compare a
large number of parties on a wide range of issues. It is very important that
VAAs are not seen by voters as simple shortcuts that save them needing to
think about the complexity of an issue and the arguments behind all the pos-
itions adopted by parties and about the policy consequences once a party’s
ideas are implemented.
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In turn, political parties and their candidates, as well as journalists and users
of twitter, social media and the blogosphere should be made more aware of
the need to highlight the substantive arguments in favor of against distinct
issue positions, without being trapped in noisy, polarized or disrespectful
debates that may only enhance volatility and fragmentation.
Note
1. To the extent that usage was low, expected effects would not be found. So our
research design is conservative in these terms.
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